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ABSTRACT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In many jurisdictions, policy makers are seeking to decentralize the electric power system while also promoting deep 
reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). We examine the potential roles for residential energy storage (RES), 
a technology thought to be at the epicenter of these twin revolutions. We model the impact of grid-connected RES operation 
on electricity costs and GHG emissions for households in 16 of the largest United States utility service territories under 
three plausible operational modes. Regardless of operation mode, RES mostly increases emissions when users seek to 
minimize their electricity cost. When operated with the goal of minimizing emissions, RES can reduce average household 
emissions by 2.2 – 6.4%, implying a cost equivalent of $180 to $5,160 per metric ton of carbon dioxide avoided. While 
RES is costly compared with many other emission control measures, tariffs that internalize the social cost of carbon would 
reduce emissions by 0.1 – 5.9% relative to cost-minimizing operation. Policy makers should be careful about assuming that 
decentralization will clean the electric power system, especially if it proceeds without carbon-mindful tariff reforms. 
 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 1 
The world must move to a deeply decarbonized energy system over the next several decades to avert the worst 2 
consequences of climate change.(1)-(2) Energy system analysts have laid out several potential pathways along 3 
which this transition might unfold,(3) and most suggest that cost-effective decarbonization will require massive 4 
electrification.(4)-(5) To provide this low-carbon electricity, many studies have focused on the role that renewable 5 
energy might play.(6)-(8) Policy makers have followed suit, promoting renewable energy as a strategy for 6 
decarbonization.(9)  7 
   At the same time, analysts have explored the benefits of an electric power system that is more decentralized, 8 
and policy makers in some jurisdictions, such as California and New York, are now actively promoting that 9 
future.(10)-(11) Many different political and technological forces are motivating interest in decentralization, such as 10 
the desire to empower consumers with greater control over their energy choices,(12) to create competition in a 11 
sector traditionally structured around regulated monopolies,(13) to defer costly investments in transmission 12 
infrastructure,(14) and to create conditions favorable to deployment of more rooftop solar photovoltaics (PV).(15)  13 
   Here we focus on the intersection of these two broad areas of academic and policy attention—the potential for 14 
simultaneous decarbonization and decentralization of the electric power system. We assess the role of behind-15 
the-meter battery energy storage in the residential sector, which we refer to as residential energy storage (RES). 16 
While there has been significant and growing research on the economics and technical benefits of energy 17 
storage(16)-(17)—in particular in the context of decarbonized and decentralized power grids(18)—our study is 18 
focused squarely on the environmental issue: if consumers on their own or in response to policy pressure adopt 19 
these systems, will greenhouse gas emissions from the electric power system go down and at what economic cost? 20 
Here most analysis of the effects of energy storage on emissions has focused on the role of large-scale (megawatt) 21 
systems.(19)-(26) While a couple of these studies find emissions impacts of energy storage case dependent,(19)-(20) 22 
several report that revenue-maximizing energy storage operation tends to increase emissions of CO2 and other 23 
pollutants in today’s power systems.(21)-(23) On the other hand, several others report that system-wide integration 24 
of energy storage could reduce CO2 emissions; by improving capacity utilization of renewable generators,(24) by 25 
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enabling a shift from coal-fired to gas-fired generation and reducing wind curtailment,(25) and if some form of 26 
carbon pricing framework can be established.(26) Beyond assessment of large-scale systems, several studies have 27 
also investigated the emissions effects of deploying storage technologies at the grid edge, notably in the 28 
commercial and industrial (C&I) sector.(27)-(28) Similar to the case in large-scale systems, increased CO2 emissions 29 
from the grid have been observed when customers in the C&I sector operate energy storage under current tariff 30 
conditions for cost minimization.(27) However, certain C&I implementations of energy storage, e.g. when coupled 31 
with a combined power generation unit and an organic Rankine,(28) could potentially achieve emissions 32 
reductions. While the case for C&I customers deploying storage is strong under certain tariff regimes—notably 33 
when customers use these systems to reduce demand charges (29)—the vision of full grid decentralization hinges 34 
on more pervasive deployment of storage, including in residential settings. Assessing how RES systems would 35 
impact emissions is crucial since, in comparison to C&I customers, residential households have different power 36 
consumption behavior, they are subject to different electricity prices, and they own much smaller systems. Yet 37 
the analytical literature in this domain has lagged far behind the visions for grid transformation. Existing research 38 
has assessed how different residential tariff structures might affect energy bills (30) or energy consumption,(31) and 39 
associated CO2 emissions. A couple of other studies has examined how RES might impact emissions when 40 
operated in modes that maximize self-consumption of PV generation in Texas, the United States (U.S.),(32) and at 41 
two locations in the United Kingdom.(33) Currently there is a lack of analysis on how the wider range of possible 42 
RES operation modes could affect emissions. There is also a lack of geographical coverage generally among 43 
studies. This study aims to fill these gaps. 44 
   This study offers the first comparative analysis of the emissions impact of RES under three realistic modes of 45 
operation that span the range of plausible near-future options: demand shifting, PV self-consumption, and energy 46 
arbitrage. The analysis samples 16 of the largest U.S. electric utilities in all eight of the regional grids in the 47 
continental U.S. Using real electric tariff and marginal emissions data, we calculate the emissions effects from 48 
RES deployment in these different modes. We also calculate what households would need to be paid to shift RES 49 
operation from a goal of minimizing electricity costs to one of minimizing emissions—a calculation that reveals 50 
the shadow level of carbon pricing that can then be compared against the cost of other mitigation options.  51 
 4 
DATA AND METHODS 52 
We formulate a convex optimization problem that determines optimal operation for RES that minimizes either 53 
household electricity costs or emissions. Solving these problems requires information about local electricity 54 
prices, household load profiles, and solar PV generation. Solving the emission minimization problem also requires 55 
knowing grid marginal emissions factors. To address these daunting data challenges, we first build a 56 
representative sample of a large cross-section of U.S. retail customers covering all eight of the major grid regions 57 
in the U.S., known as North America Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) regions (see Table S-1 for region 58 
abbreviations). We select the two utility service territories that are largest by customer size within each of the 59 
eight NERC regions(34) (herein called region-territories)—for a total of 16 region-territories. 60 
   Electricity is supplied to the majority of households in the U.S. by investor-owned or publicly-owned utilities 61 
at prices approved by state regulatory commissions. Supplied electricity differs by price, which varies by utility, 62 
as well as bulk grid emissions, which vary by NERC region. Within each region-territory, we collect utility 63 
electricity prices as reported in time-of-use (TOU) tariff schedules and applicable adjustments, allowing us to 64 
model households’ electricity costs depending on time of day, season, and location. In two NERC regions (TRE 65 
and RFC), the largest utilities do not offer a TOU tariff, so we choose the next largest utility in the region that 66 
does (see Table S-2).  67 
   Emissions due to electricity generation vary with location and time as the type of power plants activated to 68 
supply the marginal amount of energy needed changes. We take seasonal hourly grid marginal emissions in 2016 69 
from real-world conditions reported in the literature.(35)-(36) These emissions estimates are based on an analysis of 70 
hourly historic emissions and generation data from the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Continuous 71 
Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS). We use these estimates to calculate changes in emissions caused by RES 72 
systems as they alter demand (and thus the emissions intensity of electricity generation that is needed to meet that 73 
demand). 74 
   We use prototypical residential load profiles provided by the U.S. Department of Energy(37) which are publicly 75 
available. Household consumption is reported as load profiles—i.e., annual consumption with one-hour time 76 
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step—that are the simulated electrical consumption of an archetypal house model built to the 2009 International 77 
Energy Conservation Code (IECC) as well as other standards related to domestic appliances, lighting and 78 
miscellaneous electric loads(38). Load profiles are simulated considering different climatic conditions at typical 79 
meteorological year version 3 (TMY3) weather station locations(39) across the U.S.. These characterize hourly 80 
meteorological conditions from data collected over several decades. We use the subset of TMY3 sites—and 81 
associated unique household load profiles—available within each region-territory (220 in total; see Table S-3).  82 
   TMY3 data also underlie PV generation estimation for households with solar PV systems. The power output of 83 
each PV system is determined using a PV performance model(40) that calculates power generation as a function 84 
of solar irradiance, ambient air temperature, and wind speed data. Typical system parameters (Table S-4) are 85 
determined using the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s PVWatts tool (http://pvwatts.nrel.gov). Each PV 86 
system, regardless of household location, has a 5.35 kW rating, which is the average capacity installed across the 87 
region-territories under consideration (see Table S-5). 88 
   We calculate optimal RES dispatch profiles for a full year of operation (8760 hours) with two different objective 89 
functions. First, households operate RES systems to minimize household electricity costs, which is the 90 
economically rational choice. With this same goal to minimize cost, we further model a variant that adds the 91 
social cost of carbon (SCC) to the electricity cost, estimated today at $46 in 2017 dollars per emission of metric 92 
ton of CO2(41). Adding the SCC to electricity prices reveals the behavioral response of customers that internalize 93 
the carbon costs of their energy choices—independent of whether that carbon is emitted locally or from the grid. 94 
Under the second objective function, customers use RES to minimize emissions regardless of cost—which reveals 95 
the maximum potential for emissions reductions via RES. 96 
Three modes of operation for households.  The cost and effect on emissions of achieving these two goals 97 
depends on how households operate their RES devices. We look at three modes of operation (Figure 1). These 98 
modes of operation are treated as constraints on RES systems regardless of the objective functions we describe 99 
above. First, households can use their RES as demand shifting systems, in which RES systems shift the time of 100 
household electricity demand and minimize electricity costs under a variable TOU tariff. In this mode, households 101 
find the lowest cost for purchasing power, but they do not sell electricity back to the grid. This form of demand 102 
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management is currently available in every state and utility with a TOU tariff program. Residential households 103 
have historically been charged via flat volumetric rates and thus have had no incentive to shift demand. Though 104 
some utilities have offered opt-in TOU tariffs, few households have made the move(42). That is now changing as 105 
regulators consider mandatory TOU tariffs as part of an attempt to better capture the time-varying costs of 106 
electricity generation. In California, for example, the default residential tariff will switch to TOU for all 107 
households served by the major investor owned utilities beginning in 2019(43). Furthermore, our survey on 108 
residential tariff options among 562 utilities in 2017 shows that TOU tariffs are currently being offered to 109 
residential customers in 46 of the 48 contiguous U.S. even though their uptake across states varies. 110 
   In the second mode of operation, which we term the PV self-consumption mode, households that have installed 111 
PV systems use RES to maximize the self-consumption of their solar PV electricity. At present, there is little 112 
incentive to use batteries in this way because nearly all states have net metering programs that credit excess power 113 
sent to the grid at retail rates. However, new proposals to alter compensation schemes for excess generation(44)-114 
(45), or prohibit net metering altogether(46), would erode or eliminate the benefits of energy sales, which could 115 
encourage RES deployment in households with PV systems and also encourage these households to operate their 116 
RES devices to maximize PV self-consumption. We compare RES operated in this mode against a baseline 117 
without RES but that includes a PV system that is net metered, the default mode of operation today in the U.S. 118 
for most solar PV system owners. 119 
   Finally, in the third mode of operation, households with RES systems engage in two-way energy arbitrage, 120 
buying and selling electricity at retail rates to maximize revenue. This mode, while futuristic and quite demanding 121 
of local infrastructure and control systems, reflects the vision of advocates of decentralized energy management. 122 
Several U.S. states are currently exploring whether to allow households to exploit RES systems in this way(47)-123 
(49). The logic for this mode is also reflected, partly, in proposals for distributed locational marginal prices that 124 
are designed to encourage more local arbitrage and demand response(50). Logically, that same kind of arbitrage  125 
could extend to residential customers, albeit at a smaller scale. 126 
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   We assume each household adopts RES with a capacity of 10 kWh and a charging/discharging limit of 5 kW. 127 
This is in alignment with capacities typically offered by RES vendors, such as in the Tesla Powerwall, 128 
sonnenBatterie eco, and Evolve RES system (websites accessed April 2018). The 5-kW rating is sufficiently large 129 
to absorb peak solar PV generation or deliver maximum electricity demand for all modes considered in this study. 130 
In other words, RES system size is not a limiting factor in energy storage system scheduling, whether operation 131 
is intended to shift demand, self-consume PV generation, or engage in energy arbitrage (Sensitivity of the results 132 
to different system sizes is provided in the Supplementary Information). 133 
Household energy balance.  We model the household, RES, and, when present, solar PV system, at a single 134 
node behind the electricity meter of the customer. The power balance equation for household net demand p(k) at 135 
the electricity meter is given by 136 
p(k) = l(k) − g(k) + c(k) − u(k)                       (1) 137 
 
 
 
Figure 1 | Modes of operation for residential energy storage (RES) at households: (a) demand shifting, 
(b) PV self-consumption, and (c) energy arbitrage. Arrows indicate direction of power flow. Demand shifting 
is the simplest mode. PV self-consumption extends demand shifting by adding a PV system to the household. 
Energy arbitrage extends demand shifting by allowing energy back-flow to the grid. Table S-6 shows the 
baseline configurations for each mode of operation. 
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where the time step k ϵ {1, … , s} and s is the number of time steps in a day-long charging schedule. If Δt is the 138 
time-interval between consecutive time-steps k, then s = 24h/Δt. The average demand of the household over a 139 
period Δt is l(k). Similarly, the average solar generation is g(k), the average curtailed solar PV generation is c(k), 140 
and the average RES charge/discharge is u(k). All units are in kW. The variable u is positive while discharging. 141 
Net demand p(k) is the demand seen by the utility and is positive when power is flowing from the grid to the 142 
household. Similarly, curtailment c(k) is positive. 143 
   We modify variables in Equation 1 depending on the mode of operation. For modes without a solar PV system, 144 
solar generation g(k) and curtailed solar generation c(k) are zero for all time steps. For the energy arbitrage mode, 145 
net demand p(k) may be negative or positive, but for the demand shifting and the PV self-consumption modes, 146 
net demand p(k) is constrained to be nonnegative for all time steps because energy sales are prohibited in these 147 
modes. For the PV self-consumption mode, curtailed solar generation c(k) is equivalent to the excess solar 148 
generation that would have ordinarily been injected into the grid. In this case, it does not result in financial 149 
compensation to the customer. 150 
   In all scenarios, we use the observed data to be the day-ahead forecasts for demand l(k) and solar generation 151 
g(k) of each household, which is an assumption of perfect information. Though in practice real forecasts with 152 
some error would be used operationally, in this study we assume perfect forecasts to model the upper limit of 153 
RES performance, as is commonly done in the literature(32). 154 
RES model.  The rated energy capacity of the RES is represented by C in kWh. We set the initial state of charge 155 
(SOC) χ(0) to 50% of the rated energy capacity C. We define the minimum allowed SOC and the maximum 156 
allowed SOC of the RES in kWh as χ and χ, where χ ∶= 0 and χ ∶= C. We assume here that degradation is 157 
negligible to model the upper limit of RES performance (Sensitivity to degradation is provided in the 158 
Supplementary Information). The relation governing SOC is then given by χ(k) =  χ(0) −  ∑ u(k)Δtsk=1 . The 159 
RES charge/discharge u(k) consists of uchg(k) and udchg(k). The RES charge uchg(k) is constrained by 0 ≤160 
 |uchg(k)| ≤  u and the RES discharge 0 ≤  udchg(k)  ≤  u, where u and u are the discharge and charge power 161 
limit of RES, respectively. Following the literature(21),(26), we consider storage inefficiencies ηrt by dividing the 162 
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total energy lost during charging and discharging equally between the charge and discharge cycles. Whenever the 163 
RES charges, we assume that its SOC increases by ηrt
1/2 uchg(k). Similarly, when the RES discharges, its SOC 164 
decreases by ηrt
−1/2 udchg(k). 165 
RES scheduling.  A convex optimization approach is taken to determine the optimal RES scheduling for each 166 
household. We code the scripts for the optimization problem using MATLAB (Version 2016b) and solve it using 167 
the convex modeling framework CVX (Version 2.1) and the solver Gurobi (Version 7.0.2). The formulation of 168 
the optimization problem builds on previous work(51). In the following formulation, we denote vectors in bold. 169 
RES is dispatched daily following the convex optimization problem: 170 
min
𝐩ϵℝs
∆t𝛟𝐩 (2) 171 
where p is the household net demand and 𝛟 is the cost factor that is dependent on the objective under 172 
consideration. The objectives and associated cost vectors are defined as: (1) Minimizing household electricity 173 
cost 𝛟 = 𝚲, where 𝚲 is the TOU tariff that consists of pricing blocks; (2) Minimizing household electricity cost 174 
while internalizing the social cost of carbon 𝛟 = 𝚲 + λc ∙ 𝐌𝐄, where λc is the current social cost of carbon 175 
estimate and 𝐌𝐄 is hourly marginal emission estimates of each day; and (3) Minimizing emissions 𝛟 = 𝐌𝐄. The 176 
social cost of carbon λc is taken as $46 in 2017 dollars per metric ton of CO2, which equates to $38.4 in 2007 177 
dollars per metric ton of CO2. We use an inflation rate of 1.67% per year to determine the estimates for 2017. 178 
   The optimization problem is subject to an inequality constraint that describes the RES charge and discharge 179 
limits, capacity constraints, the SOC dynamics, and to an equality constraint that prevents energy-shifting between 180 
days. The inequality constraint 𝐀𝐮 ≤  𝐛 represents the dynamics of the energy storage model described above. 181 
Its definition follows the derivation given in the literature(52) except here we also consider storage inefficiencies 182 
as described earlier. The equality constraint 𝟏𝐮 = 0, where 1 is the all-1 row vector, ensures that χ(s), the final 183 
SOC at the end of each day (at time s∆t), equals the initial SOC χ(0) and hence prevents the RES from passing 184 
energy from one day to the next. The optimization horizon is one day, and RES are scheduled to minimize the 185 
objective over that horizon (See Figure S-1 and S-2). 186 
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Estimating RES impacts on cost and emissions.  To estimate the impact of deploying RES on operating 187 
costs and emissions we first calculate a baseline (see Table S-6) where households neither own RES nor PV (with 188 
the exception of PV self-consumption). For that baseline, electricity costs and emissions are a function solely of 189 
the hourly household electricity consumption. Each household is billed monthly based on their kWh electricity 190 
consumption via TOU pricing. Similar to the literature(21),(26),(32) we estimate the cost impact of RES by comparing 191 
the baseline electricity bill of each household (i.e., without RES) with their electricity bill with RES. Whenever 192 
RES shifts the net demand seen by the bulk grid, the associated change in grid emissions is calculated by 193 
multiplying the consumption increase or decrease by the applicable marginal emissions at that hour. 194 
RESULTS 195 
We first evaluate the maximum potential impact on emissions and costs from RES systems by considering 196 
idealized lossless RES systems, which is a helpful benchmark before adding real-world operational considerations 197 
in the next section.  198 
   Figure 2 shows the emissions reduction potential for RES systems deployed across the 16 region-territories 199 
under each of two goals: minimizing electricity cost (bold bars) and minimizing emissions (light bars). Regional 200 
variation in emissions reduction potential reflects the variation in marginal emissions across the eight different 201 
national grids. For instance, achievable emissions reductions within Texas (TRE), where marginal generators 202 
have higher emissions during morning hours when coal is a significant source of marginal generation, are roughly 203 
double that in the Northeastern U.S. (NPCC), where temporal variations in emissions throughout the day are much 204 
smaller since gas-fired generators are always dominant on the margin (see Figure S-5).  205 
   There is also a substantial difference between objective functions that minimize costs and emissions. Though 206 
lossless RES systems are almost always capable of reducing emissions when they are operated in ways that 207 
minimize cost, that reduction is relatively small. On the other hand, when RES systems are configured to minimize 208 
emissions via energy arbitrage (pink bars), they have, on average, about an eight-fold higher reduction potential 209 
than when configured to reduce cost. 210 
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Figure 2 | Potential annual household emissions reductions with a lossless RES system in different modes 
of operation. NERC regions are shown along the top, with the two selected utilities in each region shown along 
the bottom. The bars show mean of maximum annual emissions reductions achieved by all households in each 
region-territory under each of three modes of operation. For each mode of operation, we model two distinct 
objectives: minimizing electricity cost (dark bars) or minimizing emissions (light bars). Even when RES is 
assumed lossless (as shown here), two cases (in WECC) still lead to emissions increases when households 
minimize electricity cost. Such cases become more common when the same calculations are repeated 
considering battery inefficiencies (see Figures S-3 and S-4). 
   At least two implications follow from the analysis of the maximum potential impact on emissions. First, while 211 
much policy attention has focused on promoting PV self-consumption mainly for reasons of managing reverse 212 
power flows, this mode has the lowest effect on emissions reductions in every region-territory. Our work suggests 213 
that energy arbitrage could be most effective at reducing emissions. Second, variation in the tariff structure within 214 
a single NERC region (that is, interconnected grids with common marginal emissions) has a strong impact on 215 
emissions under different RES modes. Each pair of region-territories within a given NERC region has an identical 216 
potential to reduce emissions from energy arbitrage (see light pink bars). In contrast, where tariff structures differ 217 
across the utilities within a given NERC region, the expected emissions reductions if customers minimize 218 
electricity costs (see dark bars) differ significantly—most saliently for Texas (TRE) and the Midwest (MRO). 219 
Another striking example is observed in the Midwest (MRO) among households using RES for demand shifting, 220 
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where the emissions reductions achieved in Wisconsin (WEP) are over eight times higher than in Minnesota 221 
(NSP). This is driven by differences in tariff structures, including the duration, timing, and seasonality of peak 222 
pricing. Ultimately, it shows that reduction potentials are maximized when tariffs align favorably with marginal 223 
emission rates. 224 
Cost of using residential energy storage to reduce emissions. We now transition from an analysis 225 
of maximum potentials, which assumes that RES systems are lossless, to more realistic conditions that assume 226 
90% battery round-trip efficiency, typical of top-performing lithium-ion battery systems deployed today(53). The 227 
main effect of adding battery inefficiencies is to increase emissions; losses increase energy consumption that 228 
mainly comes from fossil fuels(36). 229 
   Figure 3 shows the change in annual household emissions when households operate RES systems under each 230 
of the three operating modes to minimize electricity costs (orange bars), minimize electricity costs that embed the 231 
social cost of carbon (blue bars), or minimize emissions regardless of cost (green bars). Within each bar lies the 232 
annual change in emissions estimates reported for each household. Orange bars further report the full range of 233 
possible annual change in emissions when RES systems are operated to minimize electricity. There is considerable 234 
variation in cost minimal operation (orange bars) because utility TOU tariffs are built on pricing blocks—i.e., 235 
periods of constant pricing—that last several hours. RES systems can operate along multiple different pathways 236 
within pricing blocks that minimize costs equally. Since marginal emissions vary within those TOU pricing 237 
blocks, each potential pathway has a different emissions footprint. Absent incentives to lower emissions, a large 238 
range of emissions can result from RES operation—as denoted by the orange bars. Different meteorological 239 
conditions contribute further variability for different households in a region-territory, albeit to a lower degree. 240 
   Three points emerge from the analysis in Figure 3. First, in each of the three modes, nearly the full range of 241 
possible outcomes for cost minimization (orange bars) involves an increase in emissions. That range of emission 242 
impacts is larger, slightly, in energy arbitrage mode—reflecting a wider range of possible outcomes when 243 
households can move power in both directions with the grid. More importantly, while maximizing 244 
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Figure 3 | Impact on annual household emissions of using RES for (a) demand shifting, (b) PV self-
consumption, and (c) energy arbitrage. For each mode of operation, we model three different objectives: 
minimizing electricity costs (orange bars), minimizing electricity costs that include the social cost of carbon 
(blue bars), and maximizing emissions reductions regardless of cost (green bars). Top (a) and bottom (c) charts 
show change in emissions relative to average household electricity emissions without a PV or RES system. In 
the PV self-consumption mode (b), change in emissions is determined relative to equivalent households 
equipped with a net-metered solar PV system without a RES system. Blue and green bars show the range of 
estimates while orange bar shows all possibilities in emissions impact during a cost-minimal energy storage 
operation by all households in each region-territory. 
 14 
PV self-consumption, no household is able to reduce emissions compared to an equivalent household that lacks 245 
RES and has installed PV with traditional net metering. These results suggest that the outcome from tariff reforms 246 
aimed at boosting residential PV self-consumption—for example, the new settlement in Arizona(54) that 247 
introduces a self-consumption reimbursement rate that closely matches current export rates for excess PV 248 
generation—will be contrary to the emission impacts that PV advocates have been seeking. 249 
   Second, adding incentives to internalize the cost of emissions (here, in the form of a carbon price) significantly 250 
reduces variation in the range of potential emissions impacts (blue bars have on average, among all modes of 251 
operation, one-tenth of the variation compared to the orange bars). A carbon price mainly shifts RES operation 252 
within a TOU pricing block (at essentially no cost) to the times that are most beneficial for emissions. As higher 253 
carbon prices would be implemented, RES would be committed more to reducing emissions directly. But under 254 
the SCC,  the savings from minimizing electricity costs far exceed the gains from avoiding emissions: the largest 255 
average annual savings from reducing emissions—those of RES operating in energy arbitrage mode at the 256 
rightmost point of the orange bars in ET (Texas)—are less than $35 (i.e., the SCC multiplied by the emissions 257 
savings obtained by moving from the orange bars to the blue bars), whereas the average annual savings in 258 
electricity costs are more than $400. Nevertheless, if households responded to a carbon price equivalent to the 259 
SCC, average household emissions across all region-territories would decrease, on average, by 0.1 – 3.9% when 260 
demand shifting, 0.3 – 2.0% when maximizing PV self-consumption, and 0.1 – 5.9% when engaging in energy 261 
arbitrage compared with RES operation that ignores the cost of emissions (In effect, shifting from the orange bars 262 
to the blue bars) 263 
  Third, only when RES systems are forced to minimize emissions—in effect, when the carbon price is 264 
impractically high—do they succeed in reducing emissions across all regions. Compared to the baseline, 265 
reductions reach 1.0 to 3.0% while demand shifting, 2.2 to 6.4% during energy arbitrage, and up to almost 0.9% 266 
when they maximize PV self-consumption (see Figure S-6). RES used to maximize PV self-consumption still 267 
mostly increase emissions; the southeastern (SERC) and southern (SPP) parts of the U.S. are exceptions. This is 268 
because the baseline condition (residential PV with net metering) provides zero-emission solar energy to the grid 269 
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during relatively high emission hours in all other region-territories. For PV self-consumption, emissions only 270 
decline in grids with relatively low marginal emissions during peak solar hours. 271 
   Contrasting the two objectives—minimizing electricity cost and minimizing emissions—helps us evaluate the 272 
incentives that might be needed to encourage emissions reductions via RES. Figure 4 shows the annual total that 273 
utilities would have to pay households to reimburse economic losses they would experience when they operate 274 
with the goal of minimizing emissions instead of cost. These annual totals are derived by taking the difference in 275 
net revenue under both cost minimization and emissions minimization scenarios, then dividing this value by 276 
differences in net emissions under both cases. On average, this shift from cost minimization to emissions 277 
minimization allows households to reduce their annual emissions from electricity consumption by 6.8% or 460 278 
CO2-kg (the amount of CO2 emissions from about 52 gallons of gasoline consumed(55)), and in several regions 279 
(Texas and Florida—TRE and FRCC) annual reductions of more than 1,000 CO2-kg are achievable (See Figure 280 
S-7). Even where reductions are significant, the associated cost of shifting to this objective is extremely high, 281 
averaging $1,100 per metric ton of CO2 emissions reduced. 282 
 
 
Figure 4 | Carbon prices needed to achieve maximum emissions reduction under energy arbitrage. 
Shown are the range of prices that would need to be offered to households for operating their RES systems to 
minimize emissions rather than the cost of electricity during energy arbitrage. Under existing tariff structures, 
the cost of such interventions is high—much higher than current estimates for the social cost of carbon ($46 
per metric ton of CO2). 
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   Variation in the incentives needed to minimize emissions across region-territories is high—from $180 to 283 
$5,160—and mainly reflects variation in the ratio of on-peak and off-peak energy prices in each region-territory. 284 
Households with RES can achieve larger electricity cost reductions where that ratio is higher—because they can 285 
shift demand between larger price differences. For instance, there is a 10-fold difference in incentives needed 286 
between the utilities of CE and DTE (both in RFC) even though they implement the same peak pricing duration, 287 
timing, and seasonality (see Figure S-5). Households in DTE (where the ratio of on-peak to off-peak pricing per 288 
kWh is 23% greater than CE) gain more from operating their RES in an economically rational way, which makes 289 
it much costlier to implement incentives that encourage emissions reductions in this region-territory. We doubt 290 
that tariff planners intended these effects, but currently there is a huge imbalance in the cost of emission control 291 
through RES.    292 
    In Figure 5, we summarize annual cost savings and associated changes in annual CO2 emissions when 293 
households deploy RES systems to minimize their electricity costs. The energy arbitrage mode is most effective 294 
at achieving the dual benefits of reducing electricity cost and emissions: eight out of the 16 region-territories 295 
succeed in doing so. In the demand shifting mode, only four of the 16 region-territories achieve both cost and 296 
 
 
Figure 5 | Annual change in household savings and emissions when operating RES under demand 
shifting (a), PV self-consumption (b), and energy arbitrage (c).  Savings and the best-case emissions 
reduction (leftmost side of the orange bars in Figure 3) are averaged across all households in a region. 
Only rarely do RES systems simultaneously achieve cost reductions and emissions reductions 
(graphically, the upper left quadrant). 
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emissions reductions. Meanwhile, the PV self-consumption mode is unable to reduce emissions and costs 297 
simultaneously in any of the locations. 298 
DISCUSSION 299 
 Energy storage is widely expected to play an integral role in efforts to deeply decarbonize the electric power 300 
system. It is expected that energy storage will help integrate distributed renewable energy resources like rooftop 301 
solar PV systems, while also providing substantial operational flexibility for grid operators. Most households 302 
adopting energy storage are likely to choose equipment vendors and operation modes that allow them to minimize 303 
electricity costs. We show that, indeed, the deployment of energy storage in the residential sector can help reduce 304 
household electricity bills, but that RES will also generally lead to higher emissions. Encouraging households to 305 
temper this increase in emissions could be relatively inexpensive if done with a carbon tax but operating RES for 306 
the goal of reducing emissions is exceptionally costly. There may be good reasons to decentralize the grid through 307 
ubiquitous installation of small RES, but cost-effective emissions control is not one of them at the moment.  308 
   An especially helpful way for policy-makers to encourage RES adoption while reducing its adverse impacts on 309 
emissions lies with reform of utility tariff structures, which are the primary reason emissions reductions do not 310 
typically follow cost reductions. Tariffs that better reflect wholesale electricity prices and the cost of emissions 311 
could prompt simultaneous emissions and cost reductions. In grids with low penetration of renewables, the effect 312 
of these tariff reforms could be minimal, but in grids where penetration is much higher, the impacts could be 313 
significant and merit analysis. More work is needed to understand whether such alignment could be implemented 314 
and at what cost. 315 
   Absent substantial tariff reform, policy-makers could still encourage environmentally beneficial RES operation 316 
by ensuring that system developers and equipment vendors favor clean energy use by tracking and adjusting to 317 
variations in marginal emissions of the bulk grid. Some of this work is already underway by third-party groups(56). 318 
   There is much interest and enthusiasm for transformation of the electric power grid—and with that, 319 
transformation of the whole energy system(57). Enthusiasm, however, is no substitute for analysis, and there could 320 
be many unintended consequences from rapid large scale technological changes(21),(27),(32). Decentralization of the 321 
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grid could become a cauldron of unintended consequences—including for emissions of the gases that cause 322 
climate change. It will be the role of policy-makers and regulators to put in place mechanisms, like new tariffs, 323 
that ensure that this transformation benefits both households and society in terms of cost savings and emissions 324 
reductions. 325 
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